Joseph raz normal justification thesis, joseph raz normal justification thesis

Joseph Raz, Morality of Law (OUP, Oxford 1986), p. 53.

Raz then uses these propositions about law and authority to defend the Sources Thesis of law. To be sure such an assumption would not be justified.

Alice and Bernard are experts in their respective fields. Two features stand out.

This assumption leads to the same first condition, i. Many of the propositions entailed by our beliefs do not play this role in our lives. Nazi rules may not be authoritatively binding, but they are the sort of thing that can be authoritatively binding, whereas statements about volcanoes cannot.

Law cannot perform the requisite mediation if it consists of whatever is stated or expressed in its sources and whatever is entailed by those expressions. His best justification may well be one which was never endorsed, not even in its fundamental precepts, by anyone in government.

But the attribution must establish that the view expressed in the alleged statement is the view of the relevant legal institution.

How is this sketchy reply to the objection to he defended?

But cannot one claim that a person X has authority which it would make no sense to attribute to X? Which of these, or of a number of alternative interpretations, is the right one varies from one legal system to another.

But they are entirely irrelevant here. If they could agree on what was fair they would not have needed the arbitrator in the first place.

Normal Justification Thesis Raz

Henceforth his decision will settle for them what to do. The canonical statement ofthis notion of legitimate authority is provided by Joseph Raz.

The answer to both arguments is the same: It may be based on an implication. It merely means that they present themselves as believing that there is such a doctrine.

I. AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFICATION

To do this one needs little more than knowledge of English including technical legal Englishand of the events which took place in Parliament on a few occasions. Are we saying that these entailments do or do not form part of the law? It does not follow, however, that they imply all that is entailed by what they say, let alone all that is entailed by it with the addition of true premises.